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INTRODUCTION 
The fair use doctrine is one of the most divisive issues in copy-
right law today. As Professor Neil Weinstock Netanel wrote, 
“[n]umerous commentators have lambasted the fair use doctrine as 
hopelessly unpredictable and indeterminate.”1 While a few coun-
tries, including the United States, have added a fair use doctrine to 
their legal codes, many others have criticized the defense for being 
                                                                                                                            
*  Associate Editor, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media, & Entertainment Law Journal, 
Volume XXV; J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2015; B.A., Tufts 
University, 2009. I would like to thank Professor Hugh C. Hansen for his help in 
examining this Note’s topic. Additionally, a big thank you to my friends and family for 
their support, advice, and encouragement over the law school experience. Lastly, to the 
best editor ever—my mom—I couldn’t have finished this journey without you 
1 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 
716 (2001). 
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fickle, and for potentially leading to much uncertainty.2 In 1994 the 
Supreme Court decided Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., which 
became a seminal case in the fair use doctrine’s evolution.3 With 
Campbell, the growth of the transformative nature of a work as a 
deciding factor in a fair use analysis began in force. Pushed forward 
with Justice Souter’s opinion, the idea of transformativeness has 
only continued to grow. In 2013, amid numerous cases decided us-
ing the fair use analysis, two stood out from the rest: Cariou v. 
Prince4 and Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc.5 Additionally, in 2014 the Se-
venth Circuit added another important ruling to the canon of fair 
use analysis with Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC.6 The rulings of 
these cases, which depended heavily on the idea of transformative-
ness, expanded the law’s previous boundaries regarding what could 
be considered transformative. 
This Note will explore the contours of the fair use doctrine, its 
expansion, and the increased use of transformative use as a fair use 
defense. Part I introduces a brief history of copyright protection 
and the development of fair use. Part II focuses on Judge Pierre 
Leval’s 1990 Harvard Law Review article Toward a Fair Use Stan-
dard.7 This article was in part written as a reaction to the Second 
Circuit’s disagreements with two copyright cases over which Leval 
presided while acting as a district court judge in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York. Part III discusses the immediate impact of Judge 
Leval’s article on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Campbell. Part 
IV follows the recent growth of transformative use in cases such as 
Cariou, Seltzer, Sconnie, and looks at certain issues with Leval’s 
interpretation. Over the years fair use has changed dramatically. 
Judge Leval’s article played a significant role in that change, ad-
vancing the doctrine and the effect of “transformativeness” to a 
point where even Judge Leval may not have approved. 
                                                                                                                            
2 See id. at 717. 
3 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994). 
4 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). 
5 725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013). 
6 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014). 
7 Pierre Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990). 
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I. COPYRIGHT & FAIR USE: A LOOK BACK 
To effectively assess the idea of fair use as brought forward in 
Campbell, it is helpful to understand the history of the doctrine and 
its place within copyright law. The British Crown originally saw the 
printing press as an instrument that needed to be controlled in or-
der to prevent propaganda and the dissemination of dangerous 
ideas.8 As the Crown loosened its grip on granting only specific 
publishers the right to print and distribute books, the printers’ con-
sortiums went to parliament looking for government protections 
which might provide financial incentives for authors to right and 
publishers to publish.9 In response, England’s parliament signed 
the Statute of Anne, the world’s first codified copyright statute, 
into law in 1710.10 The law, which granted rights to authors and the 
printers acting as their assignees, protected works from being ap-
propriated entirely and reprinted exactly as they had originally ap-
peared.11 Similarly, the first recognizable implementation of an im-
plied fair use doctrine can also be traced back to English roots from 
approximately the same era.12 However, the Statute of Anne did 
not address issues of “fractional copying” or any significant simi-
larity among works. Soon after the Statute of Anne was enacted, 
English authors and publishers deemed it unfavorable to their in-
terests.13 It was these publishers who lobbied for new laws making 
it illegal to “print, publish, import, or sell any abridgement of [a 
copyrighted work], or any translation thereof without the consent 
of the author or proprietor first obtained in writing.”14 
English courts began to hear cases concerning the abridgement 
of works and whether the creation of these condensed versions fell 
under the scope of the Statute of Anne’s protection. Courts held 
that differences existed between “real and fair” abridgements and 
books that were “colorably shortened.”15 This allowed for “real 
                                                                                                                            
8 See Pierre Leval, An Assembly of Idiots?, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2002). 
9 See id. 
10 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 § 1 (Eng.). 
11 See Matthew Sag, The Prehistory of Fair Use, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1371, 1381 (2011). 
12 See id. at 1380–82. 
13 See id. at 1381. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 1391–93. The concept of a “real and fair” abridgement is a use taking aspects 
of another work but one which is used for the furtherance of learning, invention, or a basis 
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and fair” abridgements to qualify as new works under new copy-
right and left “colorably shortened” abridgments as infringing 
works.16 The factors in the Statute of Anne that led to a finding of 
infringement were similar to those maintained by the United 
States’ current fair use doctrine.17 Both doctrines determine in-
fringements on a case-by-case analysis.18 Outcomes are based on 
the amount and context of the work taken, and include in their ana-
lyses the understanding that a work condensed for research or edu-
cational purposes would not harm the market for an original work.19 
As the first copyright law of its kind, the Statue of Anne established 
precedent in securing protection for the works of authors and pub-
lishers, precedent that would be further advanced by the Constitu-
tion and legislature of the United States. 
Until the signing of the United States Constitution in 1789, the 
Statute of Anne remained the basis for copyright law in colonial 
America.20 Between 1776 and 1789 the newly formed states estab-
lished copyright laws to govern the protection of works created 
within their territories, many of which were close approximations 
of the Statute of Anne.21 With the ratification of the Constitution, 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 granted copyright protection to its 
citizenry through Congress’ power “to promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”22 In 1790, the United States passed its first federal 
Copyright Act which established a creator’s initial rights, set time 
limits for copyright ownership, and made it possible to renew exist-
                                                                                                                            
of judgment upon the original work. A work that is “colorably shortened” is a work that is 
created by merely omitting and transposing parts of an original work. A similar distinction 
is made by current US judges in their examination the whether a work can be protected by 
the fair use doctrine. See Gyles v. Wilcox, 26 Eng.Rep. 489 2 Atk.141 (1740) (No. 130). 
16 See Sag, supra note 11, at 1390. 
17 See id. at 1394. 
18 See id. 
19 See id. 
20 L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning the Founders’ 
View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. 
Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909, 932 (2003). 
21 See id at 933–36. (highlighting that Delaware was the only state to not ratify any sort 
of statue granting copyright protection to its citizens). 
22 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
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ing copyrights, features which were already established in the vari-
ous state statutes, but which could now serve as a unified federal 
rule, pulling the states into harmony with one another.23 Perhaps by 
an oversight of the drafters, the Act only protected specific works 
including books, maps, and charts.24 However, with the advance-
ment of technology, in 1831, Congress passed a new Copyright Act 
which increased the copyright terms, and added musical works to 
the list of protectable expressions.25 
Justice Story’s decision in Folsom v. Marsh is considered one of 
the first opinions to incorporate these copyright protections from 
the newly implemented 1831 Copyright Act with the ideas which 
would later become part of the fair use doctrine.26 Here, Justice 
Story was faced with an abridgement of a twelve-volume biography 
of George Washington.27 In deciding the case, Justice Story used a 
number of English court decisions pertaining to the abridgement of 
written works, as the American judicial system had not yet delibe-
rated on many similar abridgement issues.28 Justice Story ultimate-
ly decided to enjoin the publication of the work, finding it to be an 
infringement of the original biography.29 Some scholars consider 
Justice Story’s decision to have been an attempt to ultimately safe-
guard copyrights by determining that unless a work qualified for an 
exception under the concept of fair use, the work should be held as 
an infringement.30 
                                                                                                                            
23 See Patterson & Joyce, supra note 20, at, 937–39. 
24 See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, §1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1831); MELVILLE B. 
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, app. 7 (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 
2010); Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets and Liberal 
Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186, 196–98 (2008) (asserting that 
during the development of early copyright laws, “Authorship” was limited to the written 
works noted above, and was not extrapolated out to include the other types of work later 
to be protected, such as music). 
25 See Act of Feb. 8, 1831), ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436 (repealed 1870); NIMMER & 
NIMMER, supra note 24, App. 7(d)(4)(a). 
26 Laura G. Lape, Transforming Fair Use: The Productive Use Factor In Fair Use Doctrine, 
ALB. L. REV. 677, 687 (1995). 
27 See Folsom v. Marsh, 6 Hunt Mer. Mag. 175, 345–46 (Cir. Ct. D.Mass. 1841). 
28 See generally id. (discussing cases regarding the creation of works using large portions 
of already existing books in order to supersede the need for the original, or deny the right 
to publish letters not written by the author or publisher); Sag, supra note 11, at 1377. 
29 See Folsom, 6 Hunt Mer. Mag. at 349. 
30 See Oren Bracha, supra note 24, at 229. 
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In his decision, Justice Story noted the factors which would lat-
er become the categories of fair use as codified in the Copyright 
Act: 
So, in cases of copyright . . . the question of piracy, 
often depend[s] upon a nice balance of the compara-
tive use made in one of the materials of the other; 
the nature, extent, and value of the materials thus 
used; the objects of each work . . . [f]or example, no 
one can doubt that a reviewer may fairly cite largely 
from the original work, if his design be really and 
truly to use the passages for the purposes of fair and 
reasonable criticism.31 
This statement most accurately reflected Justice Story’s deci-
sion. He continued “[i]f [an author] thus cites the most important 
parts of the work, with a view, not to criticise, but to supersede the 
use of the original work . . . such a use will be deemed in law a pira-
cy.”32 Justice Story ultimately decided that if a “fair and bona fide 
abridgement” were produced, the work would not be held to be a 
piracy, but rather a new work protectable on its own.33 While the 
decision in Folsom instilled in the law a sense of what would be con-
sidered fair use, the decision also formed a broad enlargement of 
the copyright laws in general, which greatly limited the ability of 
authors to use direct passages of works created by others. 
The Copyright Act of 1976, signed into law by President Ford 
in 1978, was the first major overhaul of American copyright law 
since the 1909 Act—which had mainly extended the terms of copy-
right available under the 1831 Act.34 By the 1970s, with the advent 
and growth of television, motion pictures, sound recordings, and 
                                                                                                                            
31 See Folsom 6 Hunt Mer. Mag. 175 at 344–45. 
32 Id. 
33 See id. at 345 (“[W]hat constitutes a fair and bona fide abridgment, in the sense of 
the law, is one of the most difficult points, under particular circumstances, which can well 
arise for judicial discussion. It is clear, that a mere selection, or different arrangement of 
parts of the original work, so as to bring the work into a smaller compass, will not be held 
to be such an abridgment. There must be real, substantial condensation of the materials, 
and intellectual labor and judgment bestowed thereon; and not merely the facile use of the 
scissors; or extracts of the essential parts, constituting the chief value of the original 
work.”). 
34 Pub. L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012)). 
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radio, the Copyright Act of 1909 had become severely outdated. 35 
After becoming party to the Universal Copyright Convention, a 
multinational treaty signed by forty total nations in 1951, Congress 
determined it was time to reevaluate America’s copyright laws.36 
Congress amended the Copyright act of 1909 to reflect the ratifica-
tion, adding subsection (c) to section 9 of the Act.37 The 1976 Cop-
yright Act, which remains the basis for contemporary US copyright 
law, established protections for new categories of works, extended 
the terms of copyrights from previous acts, and among other 
things, instituted the fair use doctrine in 17 U.S.C. § 107.38 
The fair use provision of the Copyright Act adopted many of 
the same elements Justice Story noted in Folsom.39 The fair use fac-
tors acknowledge the importance of copyright protection while still 
recognizing certain uses of copyrighted material as legal.40 The Act 
notes four factors that are to be considered in any fair use analysis: 
 1. The purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes; 2. the nature of the 
copyrighted work; 3. the amount and substantiality 
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole; and 4. the effect on the potential 
market or value of the copyrighted work.41  
The legislative history of the Act speaks to the understanding 
that during periods of technological advancement there should be a 
                                                                                                                            
35 See 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1:45 (2014). 
36 See id. § 1:72. 
37 Act of Aug. 31, 1954, Pub. L. 83-743, 61 Stat. 655. See also PATRY, supra note 35, 
§ 1:63 (“The subsection (1) provided national eligibility for works whose country of origin 
was another UCC country; (2) exempted such works from the need to provide reciprocal 
mechanical reproduction rights similar to those found in 17 U.S.C.A. § 1(e); (3) exempted 
from the deposit requirement all works by authors of a UCC country and those works first 
published in a UCC country; and (4) exempted such works from the manufacturing 
clause requirements, provided that a ‘UCC notice’ was affixed.”). 
38 See Act of Oct. 19, 1978, Pub L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541. 
39 See Folsom v. Marsh, 6 Hunt Mer. Mag. 175, 9 F.Cas. 342, 344–45 (C.C. Mass. 
1841). 
40 See 1 ALEXANDER LINDEY & MICHAEL LANDAU, LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, PUBL. 
& THE ARTS § 1:72 (3d ed. 2014). 
41 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
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broad explanation of what fair use is and how it is to be applied.42 
The House Report examined that an “endless variety of situations 
and combinations of circumstances that can arise in particular cas-
es preclud[ing] the formulations of exact rules in the statute.”43 
Therefore, “the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to par-
ticular situations on a case-by-case basis.”44 While it was Con-
gress’ intention to give judges a significant amount of discretion 
regarding their application of fair use analyses, there were critics of 
this decision, specifically regarding Congress’ choice to give so 
much power to judges— limiting the congressional power to estab-
lish a proper schema for solving fair use issues. As Leon Seltzer 
wrote in 1977, “Congress . . . has failed to articulate a coherent ra-
tionale for copyright . . . failed to define fair use . . . introduced con-
fusions between fair use and exempted use . . . and it has in the end 
tossed the fair use question, now thoroughly enmeshed in contra-
dictions, back to the courts.”45 
II. TOWARD A FAIR USE STANDARD AND ITS EFFECT 
Judge Leval attempted to reduce the confusion left by both 
Congress and inconsistent judicial opinions regarding fair use anal-
ysis with his article Toward a Fair Use Standard.46 The Copyright 
Act, Judge Leval explained, gives “little guidance” as to how 
judges should actually analyze fair use in real world situations.47 
Leval observed that the Act offered no assistance for determining 
how to distinguish what is “acceptable” from what is “excessive” 
in terms of material taken from one work and used in another.48 
Judges, Leval believed, had not yet come to a consensus regarding 
the correct way to perform a proper fair use analysis. As such, 
                                                                                                                            
42 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 LEON SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT: THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS 
TENSIONS IN THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT 17 (1977). 
46 See Leval, supra note 7, at 1106–07 nn.9–10. (pointing out a number of inconsistent 
judgments in which the court of appeals reversed the district court’s finding for the 
defendant, and was in turn reversed by the Supreme Court and considering the instances 
of “divided courts” where the Supreme Court was split on an issue of fair use). 
47 See id. at 1105–06. 
48 See id. at 1106. 
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judgments were rendered on cases, only later to be overruled, over-
turned, or remanded by judges of higher courts.49 Judge Leval 
ended his introduction by expressing the opinion that fair use 
“need not be so mysterious or dependent on intuitive judg-
ments.”50 However, he proceeded to explain fair use according to a 
system of his own belief, one that may have been developed out of 
his displeasure at having had the Second Circuit challenge and 
overturn cases he himself had decided.51 
Toward a Fair Use Standard was in part influenced by Judge 
Leval’s opinion in Salinger v. Random House, Inc. and the judg-
ment’s later reversal by the court of appeals.52 Salinger concerned 
the author J.D. Salinger and an unauthorized biography of his life 
written by Ian Hamilton.53 Hamilton approached Salinger looking 
for information and seeking Salinger’s approval of the project but 
Salinger refused both.54 Salinger had always been a private person, 
spending much of the previous thirty years outside the public eye, 
“avoiding all publicity.”55 In spite of Salinger’s refusal, Hamilton 
proceeded with his research and writing, relying on letters either 
sent or received by Salinger which had subsequently been donated 
to library collections throughout the country.56 Salinger received a 
copy of Hamilton’s work prior to its publication and promptly went 
about securing copyrights for each of his seventy-nine unpublished 
letters from which Hamilton had taken quotations.57 Salinger de-
                                                                                                                            
49 See id. at 1106–07. 
50 Leval, supra note 7, at 1107. 
51 See id. at 1111. Leval specifically points to analyzing the fair use defense not “simply 
to conclude whether or not justification exists,” but rather, “[t]he question remains how 
powerful, or persuasive, is the justification, because the court must weigh the strength of 
the secondary user’s justification against factors favoring the copyright owner.” Id. To 
this question Leval puts forth his own explanation, stating, “I believe the answer to the 
question of justification turns primarily on whether, and to what extent, the challenged 
use is transformative.” Id. 
52 Id. at 1105 (“The court of appeals’ disagreement with two of my decisions provoked 
some rethinking, which revealed that my own decisions had not adhered to a consistent 
theory, and, more importantly, that throughout the development of the fair use doctrine, 
courts had failed to fashion a set of governing principles or values.”). 
53 Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp 413, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
54 See id. 
55 Id. 
56 See id. 
57 See id. at 417. 
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manded that Hamilton remove all quotations lifted from the un-
published letters. Hamilton responded by revising the work, dra-
matically reducing the number of direct quotations and the number 
of words each quotation used.58 After being provided with a revised 
copy of the book to review, Salinger brought suit against Hamilton 
and Random House, the publisher. Salinger claimed that Hamil-
ton’s work not only infringed on the copyright of Salinger’s letters, 
but also that Salinger would also be irreparably harmed if the bio-
graphy were published and distributed.59 For those reasons, Judge 
Leval granted a temporary restraining order to allow for discovery 
and trial. 60 
After arguments, Judge Leval denied the permanent injunction 
Salinger had requested, determining that Hamilton’s use of the co-
pyrighted materials in the biography was not an infringement and 
was protected as a fair use.61 Leval based the decision on his under-
standing of the fair use analysis—where the first factor and the 
transformation of the original work is paramount—and the protec-
tions he felt the doctrine afforded to Hamilton’s work.62 Leval used 
careful consideration in examining each of the passages either di-
rectly quoted or paraphrased from Salinger’s letters. Leval’s un-
derstanding rested on the idea that “Salinger’s letters are full of 
information about his life upon which the biographer has drawn.”63 
Judge Leval determined that “virtually every passage taken by 
Hamilton from the [fifty-nine] letters consists primarily of a report 
of such historical fact which is not protected by copyright.”64 
Leval’s understanding and interpretation of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter-
prises likely influenced his decision in Salinger. Nation stated that 
copyright protection for unpublished materials should outweigh 
any claim of fair use only under ordinary circumstances.65 As Leval 
                                                                                                                            
58 Id. at 417. 
59 See id. 
60 Id. 
61 See id. at 428. 
62 See id at 423. 
63 Id. at 418. 
64 Id. 
65 See generally Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 
(1985) (concerning a copyright infringement claim brought against amagazine publisher 
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understood the holding in Nation, fair use could be determined 
with regard to unpublished works if the “secondary use is fair, giv-
ing due regard for the creator’s right to control the first publica-
tion”66 and in such a situation, the use of unpublished material 
would “be permitted.”67 Had Salinger’s letters never previously 
been exposed or accessible by the public, perhaps Leval would not 
have found Random House’s use as qualifying for a fair use de-
fense. However, because the Salinger letters had been on display in 
museums and libraries, these items should not be afforded the 
same protection as was the unpublished quotations in Nation.68 Ac-
cordingly, Judge Leval focused a portion of his fair use analysis on 
whether the use of quotations and paraphrasing from the unpub-
lished letters for biographical purposes would decrease the com-
mercial value of the letters if Salinger chose to publish them at a 
later time.69 After reviewing each of the four fair use factors, Leval 
found no reason to grant the injunction against publication and dis-
tribution, concluding “the use of copyrighted matter in the present 
form of the book is so minimal and the case favoring a finding of 
fair use is so convincing that an injunction cannot be justified.”70 
Less than a year later, the Second Circuit reversed Leval’s de-
cision on appeal.71 In an opinion by Judge Newman, the court took 
a different position than that advocated by Judge Leval. 72 While 
the court of appeals agreed that guidance should come from the 
decision in Nation, it indicated that Leval might have misunders-
tood Nation’s ruling,73 noting that “[p]ertinent to our case is the 
fact that the Court underscored the idea that unpublished letters 
normally enjoy insulation from fair use copying.”74 In Nation, the 
Court gave “special weight to the fact that the copied work is un-
published when considering the second factor, the nature of the 
                                                                                                                            
for the use of unauthorized quotations and passages from President Ford’s upcoming 
memoir, which had yet to be published). 
66 Salinger, 650 F. Supp. at 422. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 423. 
70 Id. at 426. 
71 Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Salinger II]. 
72 See generally id. 
73 See id at 96. 
74 Id. at 95. 
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copyrighted work.”75 In Salinger II, the Second Circuit found that 
the first fair use factor weighed in favor of Hamilton because the 
quotations and information “enriched” the scholarship behind his 
book.76 However, the second factor, buoyed by the ruling in Nation, 
heavily favored Salinger, outweighing any potential fair use defense 
Hamilton may have gained from the first factor test.77 That the let-
ters were unpublished was a critical aspect of their nature. Though 
the Second Circuit agreed with Leval that the Supreme Court’s 
decisions regarding unpublished works left some ambiguity, the 
Court also recognized that “Judge Leval gave no explicit considera-
tion to the second factor. Since the copyrighted letters were yet 
unpublished, the second factor was found to weigh more heavily in 
favor of Salinger.”78 
The court also disagreed with Leval’s understanding and con-
clusion regarding the third and fourth factors of the fair use analy-
sis. With respect to the third factor—the amount and substantiality 
of the portion used—the court held that “[t]he taking is significant 
not only from a quantitative standpoint but from a qualitative 
standpoint as well. . . . To a large extent, they make the book worth 
reading.”79 The court weighed the fourth factor—the effect on the 
market—slightly in Salinger’s favor, reasoning that Salinger could 
have earned in excess of $500,000 from selling the right to publish 
his letters.80 Whereas Judge Leval decided each of the four factors 
in the fair use analysis fell in favor of Hamilton and Random 
House, the Second Circuit found only the first factor to have 
worked in their favor, holding that this was not an extraordinary 
circumstance under Nation to allow the unpublished works to qual-
ify for fair use protection.81 
The second case which led Judge Leval to write Toward a Fair 
Use Standard dealt with another unauthorized biography, that of L. 
Ron Hubbard, founder of the Church of Scientology. Henry Holt & 
Co. (“Holt”) first published Bare-Faced Messiah: The True Story of 
                                                                                                                            
75 See id. at 96. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 97. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 98–99. 
80 Id. at 99. 
81 Id. 
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L. Ron Hubbard, a critical look at Hubbard’s life and the develop-
ment and growth of Scientology, in England in 1987.82 New Era 
Publications International ApS, (“New Era”) a company estab-
lished to “hold and exploit” the copyrights owned by Hubbard and 
the Church of Scientology, sought a preliminary injunction against 
the book in the English courts.83 This request was denied.84 British 
courts deemed that the injunction was requested with the intention 
of blocking criticism of the Church and its founder.85 The following 
year the book was published in Australia and Canada—where New 
Era also unsuccessfully attempted to block its publication.86 
On May 5, 1988 New Era requested a temporary restraining or-
der be issued against Holt to stop publication of Bare-Faced Messiah 
in the United States.87 By that date, 12,000 copies had already been 
distributed in the United States and a second printing was sche-
duled for the following morning.88 Judge Leval denied that first re-
quest. However, after New Era agreed to indemnify Holt in case of 
production losses, Leval granted a temporary restraining order.89 
The parties agreed to proceed directly to an expedited trial to de-
termine whether a permanent injunction was warranted.90 
Just as in the Salinger cases, New Era Publications International, 
ApS v. Henry Holt and Co., Inc. hinged on a fair use analysis. In par-
ticular, the case depended on whether unpublished copyrighted 
materials used in an unauthorized biography should qualify for pro-
tection under the fair use defense, and whether a work using such 
potentially infringing material should be restrained from publica-
tion.91 Bound by precedent, Judge Leval examined each of the four 
factors of fair use analysis to settle the dispute. Leval began by as-
sessing the second factor—the nature of the copyrighted work—
                                                                                                                            
82 See New Era Publ’ns Intern., ApS v. Henry Holt and Co., Inc., 695 F. Supp. 1493 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
83 Id. at 1498. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 See id. 
88 See id. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. 
91 Id. at 1499. 
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because New Era had contended that the use of the unpublished 
materials was clear copyright infringement.92 Judge Leval again 
took the position that the fair use defense could be raised in rela-
tion to the use of material from unpublished works.93 Leval even 
noted the issues that arose in the court’s reversal of his decision in 
Salinger II.94 Leval indicated that the Salinger II court was aware 
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Nation was ambiguous re-
garding whether the fair use doctrine could be applied to the use of 
unpublished material.95 Judge Leval determined that, in light of the 
ambiguity, it was reasonable to consider that using unpublished 
materials would diminish the likelihood of a finding of fair use, 
though in certain situations the use of those unpublished materials 
might be protected.96 
Leval examined the passages that quoted or paraphrased Hub-
bard’s unpublished letters and accounts, eventually concluding 
that “[i]t does not follow that the critic may never take copyrighted 
expression from unpublished documents.”97 Leval contended that 
an author merely has to make a 
compelling demonstration of justification . . . must 
show that her use of the protected expression is not 
done simply to enliven her text . . . must be reasona-
bly necessary to the communication and demonstra-
tion of significant points being made about the sub-
ject and must have no significant adverse effect on 
the market for the copyrighted work.98  
Because Leval found that the use of the unpublished material 
could be acceptable under a fair use analysis on that basis, he pro-
ceeded to analyze the other factors to determine whether or not the 
work was an infringement.99 
                                                                                                                            
92 See id. at 1500. 
93 See id. 
94 Id. at 1500. 
95 See id at 1501. 
96 See id. at 1501–03. 
97 Id. at 1503. 
98 Id. at 1504. 
99 Id. at 1504 1523. 
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Leval’s decision ultimately became a balancing test among the 
fair use factors. His conclusion was, in his own words, “com-
plex.”100 With regard to the published materials, Judge Leval found 
them to be sufficiently covered by the fair use doctrine and used 
appropriately in Holt’s publication.101 As to the unpublished mate-
rials, Leval determined that to conform to the narrowly focused 
decision in Nation, Holt was required to “establish a highly con-
vincing case in favor of fair use.”102 Fortunately for Holt, both the 
variety of passages submitted and the scope of the work appro-
priated in Bare-Faced Messiah persuaded Leval to recognize these 
takings as a violation of the fair use doctrine.103 Leval agreed that 
the use of Hubbard’s own words demonstrated personal qualities 
which were impossible to demonstrate through paraphrasing. The 
book’s literary value seemingly rested on many of those specific 
quotations. Leval also determined that the market for the unpub-
lished material would not be affected by the publication and distri-
bution of Holt’s work.104 However, Leval did note that, unlike in 
Salinger, a number of the quotations were used for a purpose great-
er than merely “enlivening the text,” the amount used were still 
held as infringements by the court of appeals.105 Leval concluded 
that within the work there existed “a body of material of small, but 
more than negligible size, which, given the strong presumption 
against fair use of unpublished material, cannot be held to pass the 
fair use test.”106 
However, Judge Leval’s finding against fair use still did not 
meet the necessary threshold to enjoin the publication of the 
work.107 The portions of the book Judge Leval found to be infring-
ing were “insignificant.”108 The quotes used did not seem to reach 
the “heart” of the book as determined by Nation, nor did the use of 
these quotes warrant the award of a permanent injunction relating 
                                                                                                                            
100 Id. at 1523. 
101 See id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 See id. at 1523. 
105 Id. at 1524. 
106 Id. 
107 See id. at 1528. 
108 Id. at 1525. 
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to the publication or distribution of the book.109 Judge Leval addi-
tionally noted that the book had been widely published in England, 
Australia, and Canada, and copies had already been printed and 
sold within the United States, “the expense and waste involved in 
republishing after deleting infringing material would be prohibi-
tive.”110 Leval offered the justification that an injunction would 
“diminish public knowledge” regarding a subject of public inter-
est.111 He added that a decision to enjoin the book’s publication 
would go against First Amendment reasoning, as “an injunction is 
not available to suppress defamatory speech.”112 Thus, in the in-
terest of balancing the fair use analysis and the potential free 
speech issue, Judge Leval denied a permanent injunction and al-
lowed the book’s publication and distribution to resume. 
On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld Judge Leval’s ruling, but 
for different reasons.113 In an opinion drafted by Judge Minor, the 
court agreed that the “permanent injunction should be denied, but 
for a reason wholly different from any of those set forth in the dis-
trict court’s opinion.”114 The court continued, “[m]oreover, we 
disagree with a great deal of what is said in the opinion.”115 As in 
Salinger II, the court of appeals found that only the first factor fa-
vored the publisher who had used copyrighted material, while fac-
tors two, three, and four weighed in favor of the party requesting 
the injunction.116 The court of appeals further distinguished Judge 
Leval’s reasoning with regard to the second factor.117 In Salinger II 
the court had clearly noted that unpublished works “normally en-
joy complete protection.”118 In New Era, Leval attempted to create 
                                                                                                                            
109 Id.; see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 600 
(1985). (determining the “heart” of the book settled on whether or not the information 
taken was pivotal to the book, and would affect the sale of the book and the profits 
resulting from those sales). 
110 Id. 
111 New Era, 695 F. Supp. at 1525. 
112 Id. at 1525 (citing Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 557–60 (1976)). 
113 New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Henry Holt and Co., Inc., 873 F.2d 576, 577 (2d 
Cir.1989) [hereinafter New Era II]. 
114 Id. at 583. 
115 Id. 
116 See id. at 581–83. 
117 See id. at 583. 
118 Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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a distinction between unpublished works used in order to “enli-
ven” texts and those used to elucidate “significant points” about 
the topic, a distinction which the Court of Appeals did not believe 
was warranted in this instance.119 
In New Era II, the court explained that even though Judge Leval 
had found each of the infringements to be relatively small in nature, 
collectively these small infringements created a larger work that 
could not pass a fair use analysis.120 Perhaps, if each individual in-
fringement found in Bare-Faced Messiah was the only infringement 
used in the work, and the infringements originally published, then 
the court might have held it to be a fair use of the material.121 How-
ever, in the case of Bare-Faced Messiah the individual infringements 
must have been seen as a larger infringing work. Nevertheless, the 
court of appeals was required to uphold the district court’s judg-
ment under the theory of laches, citing New Era’s inexcusable de-
lay in bringing the suit.122 The court further found that publication 
should not be enjoined because it was economically infeasible to 
reprint the book without the infringing material at the time of the 
suit.123 
Judge Oakes, concurring with the court of appeals’ judgment, 
wrote to explain that though he did not completely agree with 
Judge Leval’s fair use analysis, the court should not have “unne-
cessarily” gone out of its way to differentiate its opinion from Lev-
al’s.124 Regarding Bare-Faced Messiah, Judge Oakes agreed that the 
                                                                                                                            
119 New Era II, 873 F.2d at 583 
120 See id. at 584; New Era, 695 F. Supp. at 1523 (“I conclude that there is a body of 
material of small, but more than negligible size, which, given the strong presumption 
against fair use of unpublished material, cannot be held to pass the fair use test. I 
therefore find, under mandate of the Salinger opinion, that Bare–Faced Messiah to some 
degree infringes Hubbard’s copyrights in some of his previously unpublished works.”). 
121 See id. at 583–84. (While the court does not state so explicitly, the opinion does note 
“Following an exhaustive analysis of the doctrine of fair use, the district court finds in any 
event that a small, but more than negligible, body of unpublished material cannot pass the 
fair use test, given the strong presumption against fair use of unpublished work. Although 
we would characterize the use here as more than “small,” it makes no difference insofar 
as entitlement to injunctive relief is concerned.”). 
122 Id. at 577, 584–85 (citing New Era Publ’ns Intern., ApS v. Henry Holt and Co., Inc., 
695 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)). 
123 See id. at 584. 
124 See id. at 585 (Oakes, J. concurring). 
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district court made the correct assessment of the first factor and 
distinguished the case properly from Salinger II.125 Here Judge 
Oakes specifically notes that while too much was taken by the au-
thor of Bare-Faced Messiah, his understanding was that not all tak-
ings from unpublished works should be considered a per se in-
fringement.126 Judge Oakes’ interpretation of the second factor di-
verged from that of the other judges who decided the case. He 
noted that under Nation, the Supreme Court had merely narrowed 
the scope of protection when dealing with unpublished materials 
and had not cut off the possibility that fair use protections might 
apply to works created using unpublished content.127 Oakes re-
marked that in New Era the second factor “help[ed] to define the 
burden that is placed on the defendant to justify its use of copy-
righted material.”128 Judge Oakes’ allegiances were split with the 
final two factors, as he approved of the court of appeals’ conclusion 
with regard to the third factor, but then agreed with the distinction 
made in Judge Leval’s assessment of the fourth factor.129 Ultimate-
ly, Judge Oakes’ fair use analysis falls between Judge Leval’s and 
that raised by Judge Minor in the majority opinion. 
In New Era Publications International, ApS v. Henry Holt, Co., 
Holt petitioned for a rehearing en banc.130 The court of appeals de-
cided in a 7–5 decision to deny the request. However, in addition to 
the basic opinion stating that the rehearing was denied, four judges 
signed on to a separate concurring opinion to counter points made 
by the dissenting judges. The dissent, written by Judge Newman—
who had also written the opinion reversing Leval’s original Salinger 
decision—spoke of the court’s need to clarify its stance on the fair 
use issue regarding unpublished copyrighted material and avoid 
any misunderstanding stemming from the Court’s recent opposi-
tion to Judge Leval’s position.131 The dissent also requested that 
the court of appeals both determine whether an injunction was an 
appropriate remedy for infringement, and also decide whether the 
                                                                                                                            
125 See id at 593. 
126 Id. 
127 See id. at 593. 
128 Id. 
129 See id. at 593–94. 
130 884 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1989). 
131 See id. at 662–63. 
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court should have granted injunctions in Salinger, or if equitable 
relief was a sufficient award.132 
In response, the opinion by Judge Minor concurring with the 
denial for the rehearing en banc noted three main points: (1) the 
opinion of the court had been consistent with settled law.(2) Judge 
Newman’s dissent for the rehearing lacked the authority to dispel 
any of the misunderstandings which may have existed; and (3), 
Judge Newman’s dissent did not speak for the full complement of 
appellate judges in stating that they were not committed to the lan-
guage of the prior opinion.133 While the appellate judges may have 
decided that clarifying these issues with an en banc decision was 
not necessary at that time, clearly, the varying opinions showed a 
lack of consensus among the judges. Perhaps, the judges were look-
ing for a clarification that might prove helpful. In this regard it was 
Leval who attempted to provide that guidance in Toward a Fair Use 
Standard. 
Clarifying the issues he saw with the court of appeals’ opinions 
in Salinger II and New Era II, and attempting to settle his own is-
sues with the fair use doctrine, Judge Leval wrote, “[t]he court of 
appeals’ disagreement with two of my decisions provoked some 
rethinking, that throughout the development of the fair use doc-
trine, courts had failed to fashion a set of governing principles or 
values.”134 Toward a Fair Use Standard intertwines those overarch-
ing fair use analysis issues with questions he had faced in his chal-
lenged opinions regarding the use of unpublished copyrighted ma-
terials.135 Judge Leval contends that by developing a deeper under-
standing of the four fair use factors judges can achieve a more con-
sistent fair use analysis. 
In Leval’s view, “factor one is the soul of fair use.”136 In ap-
praising the first factor he presents the idea of “transformative 
use” which later became critical in Justice Souter’s opinion in 
Campbell.137 Leval discusses that the purpose and character of the 
                                                                                                                            
132 See id. at 663. 
133 See id. at 660. 
134 Leval, supra note 7, at 1105. 
135 See generally id. at 1105–06. 
136 Id. at 1116. 
137 Id. at 1111; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994). 
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secondary use turns on the idea of whether that use is transforma-
tive, that it must be “productive and employ the quoted matter in a 
different manner or for a different purpose from the original.”138 
While Leval does not paint the idea of transformative as singularly 
focused, he specifically states “[t]ransformative uses may include 
criticizing the quoted work, exposing the character of the original 
author, proving a fact, or summarizing an idea argued in the origi-
nal in order to defend or rebut it.”139 It stands to reason that the 
reference to these “transformative” uses of information is in-
tended to hearken back to his decisions in Salinger and New Era. 
Noting that transformative changes can apply to parodies, sym-
bolic transformations, and “innumerable other uses,” Judge Leval 
supports the idea that “the existence of any identifiable transfor-
mative objective does not, however, guarantee success in claiming 
fair use.”140 In his article, Leval identifies the issues the court of 
appeals found with his decisions in both Salinger and New Era, and 
accepts that his opinions may have been incorrect.141 At the same 
time, he focuses on the idea that quotations from unpublished co-
pyrighted works are not necessarily outside the scope of the trans-
formative concept he has espoused. In concluding his assessment 
of the first factor, Leval writes that “[the first factor] calls for a 
careful evaluation whether the particular quotation is of the trans-
formative type that advances knowledge and the progress of the 
arts or whether it merely repackages, free riding on another’s crea-
tion.”142 The idea that Leval would contend that the quotation 
must be transformative resonates with the fact that the underlying 
purpose of writing Toward a Fair Use Standard may have been 
more directed at rebutting the decisions rendered by the court of 
appeals overturning Judge Leval’s opinions in Salinger and New 
Era, and rather than clarifying the fair use analysis as Judge Leval 
maintained. Here, Leval uses his own overturned case as part of the 
basis for the new reasoning of how all judges should identify and 
assign weight to the four factors of the fair use defense. 
                                                                                                                            
138 Leval, supra note 7, at 1111. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 See id. at 1113–15. 
142 Id. at 1116 (emphasis added). 
2015] TOWARD A FAIR USE STANDARD TURNS 25 1077 
 
In assessing the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted 
work, Leval explains that this factor originated from the idea of the 
“value of the materials used” as noted in Folsom.143 Leval suggests 
that while important, “the second factor should not turn solely, nor 
even primarily” on the nature of the work as published or unpub-
lished.144 Again, as in his opinion in New Era, Leval justifies the 
position by noting that the Supreme Court did not exclude unpub-
lished works from qualifying for fair use protections in Nation.145 
Leval focuses the discussion of the second fair use factor on both of 
his cases which the court of appeals had distinguished, in addition 
to asserting that a court has the ability to allow quotations from un-
published works.146 
Judge Leval’s article does not bring any significantly new pers-
pective to the third or fourth fair use factors.147 For the third factor, 
Leval notes that generally, the larger the amount taken, the less 
likely it is that the new work will qualify as a fair use. Again, to illu-
strate this point Leval cites the Supreme Court’s decision in Na-
tion.148 Judge Leval also states that courts must be fluid in their as-
sessment of the third factor, and argues that to perform their duties 
historians and journalists must be allowed to quote and use certain 
historically accurate statements in secondary work.149 The fact that 
the court is given the authority to determine whether material 
lifted is substantial or not must go hand in hand with the fourth fac-
tor, proving the real affect of the substantiality of the taking.150 For 
the fourth factor, Judge Leval asserts that judges and courts should 
recognize that the release of a new product will always have some 
effect on the existing market.151 Leval cautions against the Supreme 
                                                                                                                            
143 Id. at 1117 (citing Folsom v. Marsh, 6 Hunt Mer. Mag. 175 (Cir. Ct. D.Mass. 1841)). 
144 See Leval, supra note 7, at 1118. 
145 See id. 
146 Id. at 1117–21. 
147 See id. at 1122–25 (evaluating the third and fourth factors of the fair use analysis in 
light of the Copyright Act, the Supreme Court decision in Nation, and Folsom v. Marsh 
but bringing in no alternative scholarship rebutting the traditional view of these factors). 
148 See id. at 1123. 
149 See id. 
150 See id. at 1124. 
151 See id. (“By definition every fair use involves some loss of royalty revenue because 
the secondary user has not paid royalties. . . . It does not necessarily follow that the fair 
use doctrine diminishes the revenue of copyright holders. If a royalty obligation attached 
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Court’s reasoning in Nation, which focused on the fourth factor 
being ultimately important in determining a fair use analysis.152 
Whereas the Supreme Court was concerned with the marketability 
of President Ford’s memoir, Leval maintains that “not every type 
of market impairment opposes fair use.”153 If Leval were to con-
cede that the fourth factor was at times most important, it would 
limit his own thesis, holding the first factor and the transformative 
nature of copyrighted uses as most important. 
In addition to Leval’s assessment of the four factors enume-
rated in the Copyright Act, he also writes of the false fair-use fac-
tors and injunctions for infringing works. Leval explains that while 
the four factors are specifically enumerated in the Copyright Act, 
there may be other additional “false” factors a judge might consid-
er to play a role in the application of a fair use defense, but which 
should not be allowed to impact a judgment: (1) good faith; (2) ar-
tistic integrity; and (3) privacy.154 Judge Leval also writes of injunc-
tions, and whether they are a proper remedy for a failed fair use 
defense.155 Leval specifically noted that with the types of cases he 
spoke of in the article, those dealing with the use of unpublished 
material in a commercial publication, “the customary bias in favor 
of the injunctive remedy” should not apply.156 Leval proposed that 
copyright law does not provide injunctive relief for a public figure 
to stop the publication of material which might reveal them to be 
“dishonest, cruel, or greedy,” nor does it prevent the printing of 
information which a private individual might “prefer to keep se-
cret.”157 Injunctions granted for copyright infringements should 
                                                                                                                            
to every secondary use, many would simply forgo use of the primary material in favor of 
free substitutes.”) 
152 See id. 
153 Id. at 1125. 
154 See Leval, supra note 7, at 1125–30. (noting that these false factors “may have 
bearing on the appropriate remedy, or on the availability of another cause of action to 
vindicate a wrong, but not on the fair use defense”). 
155 See id. at 1130–1135 (“When a court rejects a fair use defense, it should deal with the 
issue of the appropriate remedy on its merits. The court should grant or deny the 
injunction for reasons, and not simply as a mechanical reflex to a finding of infringement. 
Plaintiffs should be required to demonstrate irreparable harm and inadequacy of 
compensation in damages.”). 
156 Id. at 1133. 
157 Id. at 1134. 
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only be declared based on the merits of the copyright law issues.158 
Leval concludes the article by reinforcing the idea that there is no 
good bright-line standard for determining fair use.159 However, 
through establishing a system of analysis which takes into account 
the factors as he sees them, there would be a chance for “greater 
consistency and predictability of court decisions by disciplined fo-
cus on the utilitarian, public enriching objectives of copyright—and 
by resisting the impulse to import extraneous policies.”160 
Both the reasoning behind Leval’s article and the motive for its 
writing have been criticized since its release. Published in same 
Harvard Law Review edition, Professor Lloyd Weinreb’s article 
Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine acts as a foil for the 
arguments raised in Toward a Fair Use Standard.161 Professor 
Weinreb similarly finds the courts and Congress have left a confus-
ing set of decisions regarding fair use.162 However, Weinreb argues 
that many commentators, including Judge Leval, “considerably 
mistake what fair use is all about.”163 Weinreb explains that Leval’s 
system which sets out to, in principle, delineate when a secondary 
use should be considered fair and when such a use would be an in-
fringement, is not as reliable as a system developed out of judge-
determined rulings.164 Weinreb’s notion is that the judicial inter-
pretations and determinations as to what is “fair,” are in actuality 
more beneficial in developing a clear fair use doctrine.165 Weinreb 
recognized that copyright cases involving fair use had become con-
fusing for judges, as evidenced by overturned decisions. Such deci-
sions, like those presided over by Leval, had become common na-
ture.166 Perhaps ultimately, by amassing a larger volume of judicial 
precedent, Congress may be better able to supply the judiciary with 
clearer legislative guidelines, narrowing the leeway given to judges 
                                                                                                                            
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 1135. 
160 Id. 
161 Lloyd Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
1137 (1990). 
162 See id. 
163 Id. at 1138. 
164 Id. 
165 See id. 
166 Id. at 1137–38 (“Development of the doctrine of fair use out to proceed, therefore, 
not by deduction from principle but by induction from concrete cases.”). 
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in determining the applicability of a fair use defense. Weinreb’s 
opinion differs from Judge Leval’s presupposition that fair use 
should be decided strictly according to the “utilitarian premises of 
the copyright scheme as a whole, to the exclusion of every other 
consideration.”167 His focus revolves around the idea of “fairness” 
as opposed to the determination which Leval professes focuses 
primarily on the promotion of “production and dissemination of 
works of creative authorship.”168 
Disagreeing with many of Leval’s main points, Professor Wein-
reb works his way through each of Judge Leval’s arguments, noting 
differences in their understanding of the four factors.169 For the 
first factor, Weinreb recognizes the importance that Leval places 
on what is “transformative” and what is not.170 However, Weinreb 
comments, “transformative use is at most a limiting test, apt for 
uses that demonstrably serve neither a public purpose nor a socially 
recognized private purpose.”171 To give this higher standing than 
the other factors—as Judge Leval does—is to conceal the other 
factors behind a veil of unimportance, which was not Congress’ 
intent in crafting the Copyright Act as a balancing test.172 Unlike 
Leval, Weinreb sees the second factor as more than just an argu-
ment for the ability to use unpublished works, but rather as a need 
to guard against public use of private works, protecting the inter-
ests of privacy as well as property.173 
While Weinreb concludes that Leval is correct in noting that a 
strict quantity test is not adequate and that the third factor must be 
viewed in concert with the first and fourth factors, he disagrees 
that a “transformative” use may be able to overcome the obstacle 
of using too liberal a quantity of copyrighted work.174 With regard 
to the fourth factor, Weinreb accepts that Judge Leval’s inclination 
is correct, and that there may always be an effect on the market 
                                                                                                                            
167 Id. at 1140. 
168 See id. at 150. 
169 See id. at 1141–1148. 
170 Id. at 1142–43. 
171 Id. at 1144. 
172 Id. 
173 See id. at 1145–46. 
174 See id. at 1146. 
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from a fair use of a work.175 Weinreb also seems to agree with Leval 
that the Supreme Court’s analysis of the fourth factor as the most 
important should not be adhered to at the exclusion of the other 
factors.176 However, Weinreb disagrees with Leval that the impor-
tance of the effect on the market should be disregarded in exchange 
for a highly transformative work, which may reject an owner’s pri-
vacy or property claims.177 
While Judge Leval’s article attempted to explain fair use in a 
way which might provide greater consistency to the doctrine and 
offer judges a more standardized path to follow when deciding cas-
es, Weinreb maintained his belief that judges need not exclude oth-
er considerations, seemingly including the “false factors” noted by 
Leval, from the fair use analysis. Weinreb also asserted that the 
Copyright Act intended factors other than those mentioned in the 
Act to be taken into account.178 “Fairness is a particularly open 
concept,” wrote Weinreb, “on which almost any of the facts in a 
concrete situation may have a bearing.”179 Though even Weinreb 
admits that the concept of fairness is rather ambiguous, perhaps 
even a bit “too vague,” he still contends that the even without the 
best possible legislative guidance, if the courts use use normative 
reasoning then perhaps they will still able to determine what is 
“fair.”180 Justice Souter’s opinion in Campbell seemed to draw 
upon Toward a Fair Use Standard, in effect requiring judges to con-
form to Leval’s methodology for dealing with fair use analyses.181 
III. TOWARD A NEW FAIR USE STANDARD 
Even though Toward a Fair Use Standard was mainly intended 
as a reactionary piece in part focused on the idea of applying the 
fair use doctrine to unpublished works, the article became a focal 
point for the development of transformative works protected under 
the fair use doctrine. Justice Souter’s use of the article as a basis for 
                                                                                                                            
175 See id. 
176 See id. at 1146–47. 
177 See id. at 1151. 
178 See id. at 1152. 
179 Id. at 1152. 
180 See id. at 1153. 
181 See generally Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
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his opinion in Campbell set the tone for how transformative works 
would be viewed under fair use analyses in the future. In Campbell, 
the copyright owners of the song “Oh, Pretty Woman” by Roy Or-
bison sued the hip-hop group 2 Live Crew for copyright infringe-
ment, based on the group’s lewd rendition entitled “Pretty Wom-
an.”182 The district court granted summary judgment for the de-
fendants, but the court of appeals, reversed that decision, finding 
the rap group’s parody was not fair use of copyrighted song.183 In 
an opinion by Justice Souter, the Supreme Court held that com-
mercial character of song parody did not create presumption 
against fair use.184 Although Justice Souter first notes Judge Leval’s 
article when discussing the history of “fair abridgments,”185 the 
most important references are at the end of the opinion’s introduc-
tion. Judge Souter noted that each of the factors “are to be ex-
plored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of 
copyright.”186 By stating this and referring to Leval, Justice Souter 
seems to indicate that courts should adhere to the standard Leval 
set for weighing the fair use factors. The second major reference to 
Judge Leval’s article is found in Justice Souter’s explanation of the 
first factor of copyright. Justice Souter explains that a first factor 
test boils down to whether the potentially infringing work is trans-
formative, and to what extent.187 Here Justice Souter seems to ac-
cept the premise of Judge Leval’s article calling for the examination 
of fair use under the guise of creating a more utilitarian copyright 
scheme: “Although such transformative use is not absolutely ne-
cessary for a finding of fair use . . . the goal of copyright, to promote 
science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of trans-
                                                                                                                            
182 Id. at 573. Orbison’s original song spoke of a “pretty woman, walkin’ down the 
street” and the ensuing attempt of a man to get her to notice him as she walks by him. 
Alternatively, the version created by 2 Live Crew was of a different ilk. The parody spoke 
of four different women, one pretty, one hairy, one bald, and yet another who was 
cheating on her boyfriend. In each of those verses the women are either objectified or 
derided. The two songs were about as different as possible while still employing the same 
basic underlying musical composition. 
183 See id. 
184 See id. at 584. 
185 Id. at 576. 
186 Id. at 578. 
187 See id. at 579. 
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formative works.”188 Thus, Justice Souter refocused copyright and 
the application of the fair use doctrine into a concept based on the 
idea of transformative use. Although Justice Souter examined the 
other three fair use factors, it was the transformative nature of the 
song as a parody identified in the first factor that outweighed the 
other factors.189 By utilizing Judge Leval’s article in the opinion, 
Justice Souter himself transformed into law an article that was 
seemingly written as a response to the court of appeals distinguish-
ing two of Leval’s cases. 
A month after the Campbell opinion was handed down, Judge 
Leval delivered an address at Cardozo Law School, which was 
transcribed and published in the Cardozo Arts and Entertainment 
Law Journal, titled Campbell v. Acuff-Rose: Justice Souter’s Rescue of 
Fair Use.190 Amid the flowery language and the thanks Judge Leval 
extended to Justice Souter for having cited his article, Judge Leval 
explained that the opinion suggested copyright law was finally on 
the right track after having “been lost adrift for a turbulent dec-
ade.”191 Leval asserted that with the decision in Sony Corporation of 
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. the Supreme Court had lost 
sight of the necessity of finding productivity as an essential re-
quirement for a fair use.192 This, Judge Leval explained, was how 
fair use and copyright law had originally lost its way. Now, with 
Justice Souter’s holding in Campbell, Leval proclaimed that the 
Supreme Court had “fixed the rudder and restored the compass 
bearing” for copyright.193 
While he believed the ship had been righted, Leval acknowl-
edged that Souter’s opinion would not satisfy the entire “copyright 
community.”194 In spite of this, Leval felt the Supreme Court had 
                                                                                                                            
188 Id. 
189 See id. at 585–95. 
190 Pierre Leval, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose: Justice Souter’s Rescue of Fair Use, 13 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19 (1994). 
191 Id. at 19. 
192 See id. at 19–20 n.4. (“The Court in Sony held that private home videotaping of a 
copyrighted television program to be used solely to permit a one-time private non-
commercial home viewing at a time more convenient than the hour of broadcast, would 
not infringe the copyright because it would constitute a fair use.”) (emphasis added). 
193 Id. at 22. 
194 See id. at 23. 
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set right the fair use analysis’ focus, emphasizing that courts 
should view the factors in concert with one another, while placing 
an emphasis on the “productive” or “transformative use.”195 For 
Leval, Campbell was a vindication of his opinions in Salinger and 
New Era. His lecture was a victory lap, producing no new salient 
insights on copyright or fair use. Rather, it was “a toast to fair 
use . . . now refixed . . . on its goal,” for which Leval felt he had 
been an inspiration.196 
Judge Leval again spoke about his article and the fair use doc-
trine at the annual Nimmer Lecture at UCLA in 1997. He con-
cluded his speech with the following, 
I return, in conclusion, to the great Mel Nimmer. 
He recognized that the inclusion of superfluous 
words in the [copyright] statute was likely to cause 
trouble. While the fair use statute was under consid-
eration, he recommended that it be pared down to 
the bare bones: “fair use . . . is not an infringe-
ment.” Had his wisdom been followed, many of 
these quixotic misadventures might have been 
avoided.197  
Yet this is perhaps the opposite of what Judge Leval advocated 
for in Toward a Fair Use Standard. Toward a Fair Use Standard can 
be seen as having a dual nature. The article asserts that Leval’s 
opinions in Salinger and New Era were correct and that the court of 
appeals was misguided in reversing and challenging his judg-
ments.198 At the same time, however, it advocates for the utilitarian 
purpose of the copyright act as it applies to the fair use doctrine.199 
Both natures, are linked under the guise of discussing the issues, 
pitfalls, and solutions to dealing with fair use.200 Thereby, it is 
                                                                                                                            
195 Id. (noting the most important footnote of Campbell was likely to be footnote 10, 
which directly referenced his article, commenting that injunctions are not always the most 
appropriate remedy in cases of borrowing). 
196 Leval, supra note 184, at 26. 
197 Pierre Leval, Nimmer Lecture: Fair Use Rescued, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1449, 1466 (1997). 
198 Id. at 1461–62. 
199 See Leval, supra note 7, at 1135. 
200 Mitch Tuchman, Judge Leval’s Transformation Standard: Can it Really Distinguish 
Foul from Fair?, 51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 101, 106 (2003). Tuchman himself offers a 
critique of Leval that eventually reaches the conclusion that Leval’s standard has been 
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possible that those who subscribe to Leval’s view “might easi-
ly . . . fail to ponder whether transformative use is a diaphanous 
veil . . . behind which subscribing judges . . . continue in close cases 
to permit aesthetics to operate as an inarticulable test in copyright 
law.”201 Leval himself made no claim for the utility of this doctrine 
beyond its relation to “the second author” including historians, 
biographers, journalists, and critics.202 
IV. TRANSFORMATIVE USE TODAY AND LEVAL’S LEGACY 
In the twenty years since Campbell was decided, there has been 
an increase of cases in which courts find that transformative sec-
ondary use is fair use.203 There are two specific trends which must 
be noted when discussing the growth of transformative uses as an 
aspect of the fair use defense: that the transformative use test is 
applied by almost all courts when faced with a fair use defense; and 
that courts are placing much more apparent worth on the first fac-
tor and the transformative nature of the secondary use, almost to 
the exclusion of the other three factors.204 This trend is alarming as 
Judge Leval’s article was not intended to make the first factor the 
only factor taken into consideration, but rather to prove that trans-
formative uses should be weighed according to the utilitarian value 
of the product created by the secondary user in relation to the other 
factors.205 However, even though there may still be debate as to the 
                                                                                                                            
used by a variety of courts, but there has been little consistency or predictability with the 
outcome of such cases. 
201 Id. at 102. 
202 See id. at 118. 
203 See generally Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 
(2009). 
204 See Jennifer Pinto, Has the Transformative Use Test Swung the Pendulum Too Far in 
Favor of Secondary Users?, 56 ADVOC. (Idaho) 26, 28–29 (2013) (discussing collected 
empirical evidence to show the statistics for each of these contentions. Between 2001-
2010 the Defendant won in 100% of cases when the court found the secondary use is 
transformative). 
205 Leval, supra note 7, at 1110–11. (“Following Story’s articulation, the statute lists four 
pertinent ‘factors to be considered’ ‘in determining whether the use made of a work in 
any particular case is a fair use.’ They are, in summary, the purpose and character of the 
use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the quantity and importance of the material used, 
and the effect of the use upon the potential market or value of the copyrighted work. Each 
factor directs attention to a different facet of the problem. The factors do not represent a 
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reasons for the creation of copyright law, whether for the utilitarian 
purpose Leval holds, or to “promote and foster creative growth in 
the sciences, arts and other creative endeavors,” the two are best 
balanced when a compromise can be struck between the rights of 
copyright holders and the legitimate need to protect the creative 
pursuits of secondary users.206 
Leval’s Toward a Fair Use Standard spoke of the “writers, pub-
lishers and other would-be fair-users,” who “lack a reliable guide 
on how to govern their conduct.”207 That ever-expanding guide on 
conduct has been clearly advanced by three recent decisions: Selt-
zer v. Green Day, Inc.,208 Cariou v. Prince,209 and Kienitz v. Sconnie 
Nation LLC210. The two former cases illustrate that the recent shift 
toward favoring the first fair use factor and the transformative use 
over the three other fair use factors has taken too large a foothold in 
the determinations of what can be held as a fair use, the latter that 
judges and circuits are still split as to how to proceed with a fair use 
analysis. Decided by the Second Circuit, Cariou dealt with the fair 
use appropriation of portraits and landscape photographs taken by 
Patrick Cariou, a professional photographer who collected images 
over a six-year period of living among the Rastafarians.211 Cariou 
compiled the portraits into a coffee-table book entitled Yes Rasta, 
which, prior to the suit, had sold 5,791 copies.212 Aside from those 
sales, which netted Cariou approximately $8,000, Cariou never 
licensed or sold the photographs to any other individual.213 Richard 
Prince, a well-known appropriations artist, came across Yes Rasta 
in a bookstore, and proceeded to create thirty pieces of art using 
images from Cariou’s work.214 Some of the images were merely the 
                                                                                                                            
scorecard that promises victory to the winner of the majority. Rather, they direct courts 
to examine the issue from every pertinent corner and to ask in each case whether, and 
how powerfully, a finding of fair use would serve or disserve the objectives of the 
copyright.”). 
206 See Pinto, supra note 204, at 30. 
207 Leval, supra note 7, at 1135. 
208 Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013). 
209 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). 
210 Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014). 
211 See id. at 699. 
212 See id. 
213 See id. 
214 See id. 
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original Yes Rasta prints with altered color schemes and separate 
images photoshopped and layered on top of the print. Others were 
more overtly changed, with multiple layers of color and additional 
elements altering the perspective and theme.215 Cariou found out 
about Prince’s appropriation of his work and filed suit for copyright 
infringement.216 Despite the district court’s initial finding that all of 
Cariou’s works were protected by fair use, the Second Circuit 
found that all but five of the thirty works created by Prince were 
protected as fair uses and the remaining five works would be de-
cided by the district court on remand.217 The opinion based its in-
terpretation on the theory that Prince’s secondary use was trans-
formative, with support taken both from Campbell and from Leval’s 
Toward a Fair Use Standard stating that the secondary use “must 
be productive and must employ the quoted matter in a different 
manner or for a different purpose from the original.”218 However, 
the works appropriated by Prince were, even by his own admission, 
not transformed to a great degree.219 
Though twenty-five of the images qualified for the fair use de-
fense, the court took issue with five of Prince’s altered images.220 It 
recognized that these works neither provided sufficient commen-
tary on the originals, nor a distinct enough image or feeling from 
the original to be seen as transformative. When examining the 
fourth of the fair use factors, the court concluded that the five im-
ages the court took issue with did “not sufficiently differ from the 
photographs of Cariou’s that they incorporate”, and retained the 
“cumulative effect” presented in the originals.221 Judge Wallace, 
concurring and dissenting with the opinion, remarked “I fail to see 
how the majority in its appellate role can ‘confidently’ draw a dis-
                                                                                                                            
215 See id. at 699–700. 
216 See id. at 704. 
217 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 712 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Cairou v. Prince, 784 F. 
Supp. 2d 337, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)). 
218 Leval, supra note 6, at 1111. 
219 See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707. (As a part of his deposition Prince noted that “do [es]n’t 
really have a message,” that he was not “trying to create anything with a new meaning or 
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intent.”). 
220 Id. at 698-9. 
221 See id. at 710–11. 
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tinction between the twenty-five works that do not readily lend 
themselves to a fair use determination.”222 He continued: 
Certainly we are not merely to use our personal art 
views to make the legal application to the facts of 
this case . . . I mean no disrespect to the majority, 
but I, for one, do not believe that I am in a position 
to make these fact and opinion intensive decisions 
on the twenty-five works that passed the majority’s 
judicial observation.223  
The ruling in Cariou became the broadest application of what 
had been considered transformative.224 The problem presented was 
that, especially with appropriation art, judges are now called to 
question what is transformative in the first place. In addition, 
judges are seemingly required to make determinations about fair 
use according to their subjective opinions and not according to a 
principled set of guidelines as Leval hoped to formulate.225 Judge 
Leval’s proposed system may serve to further confuse what is a 
derivative work and what is a transformative work, requiring that 
decision to come from a judge’s subjective artistic impression. 
While this distinction poses a rather focused doctrinal issue, the 
necessity for a clear framework would be called into question, forc-
ing artists to risk more by publicly presenting their work.226 
The problem of applying the fair use doctrine with regard to 
transformative secondary uses is not, however, confined to the 
Second Circuit. The Ninth Circuit court of appeals recently built 
on the Second Circuit’s decision in Cariou and gave even greater 
deference to the transformation of copyrighted material in Seltzer 
v. Green Day, Inc. The case involved Green Day’s use of the image 
entitled Scream Icon created by artist and illustrator Derek Selt-
zer.227 The image appears as a woman’s face, mid scream with a 
                                                                                                                            
222 Id. at 713. 
223 Id. at 714. 
224 See Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, Copyright Law – Fair Use – Second Circuit Holds That 
Appropriation Artwork Need Not Comment on the Original to be Transformative – Cariou v. 
Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013), 127 HARV. L. REV. 1228, 1228 (2013). 
225 See id. at 1234. 
226 See id. at 1235. 
227 Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1173–74 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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close perspective on the mouth, seemingly mid-scream. Scream 
Icon appeared in a video incorporated into the backdrop for the 
band’s concerts between July and November 2009.228 The only 
visible changes made to the original image were a red cross placed 
over the middle of the face and black streaks added to the right side 
of the image.229 Just as the Second Circuit had done, the Ninth 
Circuit found that the appropriation of the image was a fair use, 
even though the work was not significantly altered, and in spite of 
the fact that Green Day’s use still featured the image as “street 
art.”230 Not only was the image appropriated by Green Day in the 
same “street art” setting as the artist originally intended it, but it 
was used by the band for a commercial purpose. Instead of finding 
in favor of Seltzer, the court held that the additional content incor-
porated to the original to slightly alter the image was enough to 
consider it transformative.231 
Under the court’s analysis of the first factor, the transformative 
use in Seltzer does not necessarily conform to the standard set by 
Leval and utilized by Campbell. The court in Seltzer specifically 
cites, and implicitly accepts Leval’s explanation of what is trans-
formative.232 “Green Day used the original as ‘raw material’ in the 
construction of the four-minute video backdrop. It is not simply a 
quotation or a republication, although Scream Icon is prominent, it 
remains only a component of what is essentially a street-art focused 
music video.”233 Although, in his article, Judge Leval holds fast to 
the idea that “the existence of any identifiable transformative ob-
jective does not, however, guarantee success in claiming fair 
use.”234 
Leval persisted that the extent and use of the material must still 
be taken in concert with the other factors, each of which should be 
scrutinized to determine if the use of copyrighted material may still 
                                                                                                                            
228 See id. at 1174. 
229 See id. 
230 Kim J. Landsman, Does Cariou v. Prince Represent the Apogee or Burn-out of 
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be considered a fair use.235 Following this procedure, the Ninth 
Circuit engaged in the necessary analysis of the other fair use fac-
tors. The second factor in the fair use test favored Seltzer. Though 
the image had been publicly displayed, it was still a “creative work, 
meriting strong protection under this factor.”236 The court held 
that the third factor, the extent of the work taken, “does not weigh 
against Green Day.”237 However, this assertion appears to be mis-
taken. Though the court noted that the image was “not meaning-
fully divisible,” even Leval recognized that the greater the percen-
tage of a work taken the less likely a fair use could be found.238 In 
Seltzer the entire image was appropriated.239 Lastly, the Ninth Cir-
cuit found that the fourth factor weighed in favor of Green Day as 
Seltzer accepted that the value of his work had not decreased.240 
It seems that, perhaps as trends indicate, the court was swayed 
more by the idea that the use of the image was transformative, and 
therefore a fair use, then it was by whether Green Day’s appropria-
tion of the work met the utilitarian aspect of copyright as suggested 
by Leval. This forces one to reflect on an excerpt from the conclu-
sion of Leval’s article. “The stimulation of creative thought and 
authorship for the benefit of society depends assuredly on the pro-
tection of the author’s monopoly. But it depends equally on the 
recognition that the monopoly must have limits.”241 What value 
then, according to Leval’s reasoning, does the use of a copyrighted 
image have in the background of a Green Day concert? It is unlikely 
that the band’s use would have met the threshold of which Judge 
Leval spoke in Toward a Fair Use Standard. Leval had been swayed 
by the fact that he believed the appropriation of unpublished letters 
added value to the biographies referenced in Salinger and New 
Era.242 There is the likelihood that even Leval may not have view 
Seltzer through the same lens of transformativeness. 
                                                                                                                            
235 See id. at 1122–23. 
236 Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1178. 
237 Id. at 1179. 
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2015] TOWARD A FAIR USE STANDARD TURNS 25 1091 
 
Although Cariou had been criticized by both law review articles 
and amicus curie, until the decision in Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation 
LLC, no circuit court decision had ever disagreed with the trans-
formative ideas behind the Second Circuit’s decision. Much like 
with Cariou and Seltzer, Sconnie pertained to the unauthorized use 
of a copyrighted photograph, out of which a new “work” was 
created. Sconnie Nation LLC, an apparel company dedicated to 
creating clothes for University of Wisconsin students and fans, 
created a shirt design for the school’s 2012 Mifflin Street Block 
Party.243 The shirt featured an image of Paul Soglin, Mayor of 
Madison, Wisconsin. The image had been copied, tinted a green 
color, and the words “Sorry for Partying” were written next to his 
face.244 The photographer of the original image, Michael Kienitz, 
became aware that his image was being used for this purpose, copy-
righted the work, and initiated the lawsuit for copyright infringe-
ment against Sconnie Nation LLC.245 Though the circuit court 
upheld the district court’s decision that the use of the copyrighted 
image was protected by the fair use defense, Judge Easterbrook’s 
opinion questioned whether the “transformative use” argument is 
appropriate in making such determinations.246 Judge Easterbrook 
specifically targets the idea of transformative as decided in Cariou 
noting: 
We’re skeptical of Cariou’s approach, because ask-
ing exclusively whether something is “transforma-
tive” not only replaces the list in § 107 but also 
could override 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), which protects 
derivative works. To say that a new use transforms 
the work is precisely to say that it is derivative and 
thus, one might suppose, protected under § 106(2). 
Cariou and its predecessors in the Second Circuit do 
no explain how every “transformative use” can be 
“fair use” without extinguishing the author’s rights 
under § 106(2).247  
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1092 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:1057 
 
Judge Easterbrook settles his assessment of the fair use argu-
ment by looking at the statutory list as noted in 17 U.S.C. § 107, 
focusing on the fourth factor.248 
In focusing on the fourth factor, the circuit court’s assessment 
of the fair use defense fell mostly on the understanding that al-
though Sconnie Nation LLC could have used any image of the 
Mayor, there was, in effect, no market for the copyrighted im-
age.249 Kienitz had licensed the image to the Mayor’s office for no 
royalty.250 The image was available for all to download and view at 
no cost.251 There was also no real secondary market for the image, 
nor did Kienitz have any plans to distribute the image as a part of 
any apparel.252 While the use of the image may have injured the 
future opportunities Kienitz was offered due to negative publicity, 
that was not the argument he presented in the suit.253 
Judge Leval’s Toward a Fair Use Standard, which was in effect 
canonized by Justice Souter’s opinion in Campbell, and later refe-
renced in Cariou and Seltzer as a foundation for the broad scope of 
transformativeness, seemingly removes a portion of what had once 
been considered “fair” about the fair use doctrine. Professor 
Weinreb criticized this very issue. Weinreb delved into the idea 
that the transformative approach espoused by Judge Leval is not 
necessarily as fair as he had contended.254 By equating the first fac-
tor of the fair use defense to the “soul of fair use,” the concept of a 
work being transformative is no longer merely part of one of the 
four factors that must all be given equal weight. Leval’s doctrine 
holds transformativeness paramount in achieving the utilitarian 
purpose of the Copyright Act. But what exactly is transformative? 
As is evidenced by his decision in American Geophysical Union v. 
Texaco, Inc., even Judge Leval did not find all secondary uses of co-
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pyrighted material transformative.255 In many ways, Leval’s article 
has helped to usher in a period when a “transformative” or “pro-
ductive” use is simply creating a new work or product with enough 
differences from the original to be considered something new.256 
Allowing judges to determine what is productive or transformative 
may fall outside of the scope of what is in actuality “fair” for the 
creators of original works.257 
Judge Leval’s conclusion in Toward a Fair Use Standard at-
tempted to bring his discussion of the fair use factors full circle. He 
reminded readers of the trouble Justice Story experienced with Fol-
som when determining whether an appropriation of copyrighted 
material was acceptable. “It is not . . . easy to arrive at any satisfac-
tory conclusion, or to lay down any general principles applicable to 
all cases.”258 To that end, Judge Leval wrote his article to propose 
a better test, a “bright-line standard” which could be used to give 
fair use “greater consistency and predictability” in court deci-
sions.259 As fate would have it, the fair use mantle was passed from 
Story to Leval through Justice Souter and the Supreme Court, who 
made it law in Campbell. Today, fair use remains problematic. De-
cisions such as Cariou and Seltzer, which extend the reach of the 
transformative use as a fair use defense, seem to push Leval’s ra-
ther focused article further and further away from its original pur-
pose. Others, such as Sconnie, show a disagreement between the 
circuit courts and judges as to the application of Leval’s principles, 
reminding readers that transformativeness is “not one of the statu-
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tory factors, though the Supreme Court mentioned it in Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose.”260 
Toward a Fair Use Standard, initially a reaction to overturned 
and distinguished rulings, may have led a once “fair” public policy 
into rather “foul” territory. 
CONCLUSION 
Toward a Fair Use Standard has grown from humble beginnings 
as a law review article, perhaps written as a reaction to the displea-
sure Judge Leval felt at having two of his decisions overturned, into 
a pillar on which current copyright law is shakily based. While it is 
unlikely that such a statement will ever fully be substantiated, the 
growth and change of transformativeness in regard to fair use de-
fenses is clear. Perhaps, due to recent circuit disagreements, in the 
years to come, legislative changes will be made to the Copyright 
Act. Hopefully such changes will eliminate some of the ambiguity 
in the fair use analysis, taking the decisions out of the hands of 
judges and placing it into a clearly defined doctrine. For now 
though, Leval, his judgments, and the impact of his work are clear-
ly recognized. 
                                                                                                                            
260 Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758. Judge Easterbrook also critiques 
the Second Circuit’s suggestion “that ‘transformative use’ is enough to bring a modified 
copy within the scope of § 107.” Id. 
